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Protecting vulnerable populations
from armed forces. Whether or not one
believes a line between combatants and noncombatants can or should be maintained,
the fact is many aggressive parties are willing
to force noncombatants into their conflicts.
Whether the noncombatants are “innocent”
or are implicated by association and by providing indirect support to combatants, they
require defense. To the extent landmines
help to provide that defense, they protect
children and farmers, viz, those people who
tend to be the focal point of the humanitarian campaign to ban landmines.
If we take the moral argument against
all landmine use seriously, then we have to
conclude that it is wrong to use mines to
defend these populations. If we join supporters of the ICBL in stigmatizing landmine use, we must also stigmatize people
who want to defend these populations. We
would have to stigmatize people who are
glad mines are used to defend them from
rape and murder. We would have to stigmatize families of soldiers who are glad that
their spouses and children have one more
means of ensuring that they come home.
Suppose for the moment the choice to use
mines is mistaken. Even so, what this warrants is education, not vilification. But there
are many cases where the choice to use mines
was not mistaken; the choice to use mines
saved lives. For instance, it was thick belts of
landmines that protected thousands of residents in Sarajevo from meeting the same fate
as Srebrenicans. Perhaps next to the photos
of people who were injured by landmines, we
should add the photos of women and girls
who were not raped, and fathers and sons
who were not removed in the night.
Self-defense of vulnerable populations. Although proponents of the ICBL
often work in or come from countries afflicted by landmines, the framework that
they have developed does not seem to take
into account all that it should. There is
something wrong with the strategy to the
extent that it includes vilifying those who
try to protect parties who do not wish to be
included in conflicts. But perhaps an even
more troubling problem pertains to cases
of landmine use, which the general public
tends not to hear about. The way one learns
of these cases is by speaking to people in
the field: deminers and the people who live
there. Consider the following example:
Cambodians have endured a longstanding problem with bandits. Kidnappings associated with the Khmer Rouge received
attention but are now dismissed as a thing of
the past. At least some of the deminers who
were working in Cambodia in the 1990s

know that at times it was the villagers who
were laying mines to protect themselves from
attack and theft by dispersed Khmer Rouge
and other bandits.11 Travel Web sites assure
us that it is now safe to travel to Cambodia.
Perhaps for tourists, it is.
Let us return to the case of Sarajevo.
Deminers are currently assisted by maps
showing where conflicting armies deployed
mines. However, their mission is considerably more difficult because not all mines
were deployed by military forces. According
to Dino Bulsuladzic of the University of
Western Australia, “There are  zones that
were not mined by the military but rather
by civilians themselves. One example is that
of houses and gardens, more or less isolated,
[that] were mined by their owners for protection out of fear of being attacked. The
minefields of Sarajevo, in reality, are many
more than those marked on the maps.”12
These were civilians using mines to protect
themselves while United Nations peacekeepers watched as everything these citizens held
dear was being destroyed.
Conclusion
To demonize landmines per se is to demonize not only the guerrillas and the oppressive regimes that are effectively judged
by their aims and methods anyway. There
are people who use mines for their own
defense in the longstanding absence of adequate protection from police, the military
and even the United Nations. To pretend
that landmines do not serve these purposes
is to obfuscate the conditions of the vulnerable populations who are compelled to
use them to defend themselves when no one
else will.
Although people who oppose all landmine use have not caused the acute problems faced by vulnerable communities, I
would suggest that the stifling of debate and
the willful overlooking of such cases implicates them in terms of skewing our response
to these communities. If noncombatants
turn to landmines for self-protection, they
must be particularly vulnerable. When the
self-appointed authorities on the matter fail
to acknowledge such cases exist, it makes it
sound like there are no such cases, rendering the extent of their vulnerability invisible.
And when we pretend landmines never help,
we worsen the situation of some communities. Because by denying them recourse to an
effective tool, we make them more vulnerable. And by denying ourselves recourse to
an effective tool, we make it easier to give
ourselves permission to claim that there is
nothing we can do either.
See Endnotes, page 109

A Firm Foothold:
f o c u s

Protecting vulnerable human populations. The ICBL has done a great service in raising awareness about the damage
caused by landmines. Much of their case
rests on the fact that mines do not discriminate between combatants and noncombatants. As we know, the damage extends far
beyond the physical injuries themselves.
The social stigma and the added economic
burden that a loss of a productive person
creates for victims and their families are
additional harms.
Further harm results not from actual
detonations, but from the belief that landmines are present in the area. The threat of
mines blocks access to vital resources such
as land, water, housing, public buildings,
infrastructure and transport. Avoiding injury requires curtailing or refraining from
securing subsistence or additional economic
productivity. To make matters worse, mined
roads prevent the transport of goods once
collected or grown, thereby preventing income and trade.
However, while landmines can be used
by someone on the outside to keep a group
contained within a confined territory, so too
can they be used to protect a group within a
circumscribed territory by keeping dangerous persons out. Landmines were originally
intended for purposes of defense; the fact
that some now use them on the offense does
not mean that landmines cease to play this
defensive role.

RONCO Operations in Sudan
Over the past four years, RONCO has established a continuing presence in Sudan,
following the Nuba Mountains ceasefire, with the deployment of quick-response teams
to conduct emergency mine-clearance tasks. Currently, RONCO is creating and
sustaining an indigenous mine-clearance, survey and disposal capacity in southern
Sudan on behalf of the United Nations. In addition to the threat of extensively mined
roads and infrastructure, RONCO had to overcome a number of obstacles, including
inclement weather, disease and an increasing security threat due to rebel activity.
Sudan’s austere and hostile conditions
are not dissimilar to those RONCO
experienced in Afghanistan and Iraq,
but as RONCO has discovered in those
two countries, the long-term impact of
the work far outweighs its challenges.
by John Lundberg [ RONCO Consulting Corporation ]

S

udan presents a variety of problems for mineaction operations. Control of the country, which
had been at war since 1983, is now divided between the Sudanese government and the Sudanese
People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), with
government forces claiming the majority of the north
and both sides maintaining some control in the
south. Both the government and the Sudanese People’s
Liberation Army used landmines throughout the civil
war and as a result, landmines now pose a serious threat
to civilians. For example, the United Nations reports that
in 2004, landmines were responsible for more than 15 
deaths and 30 injuries. The actual number of deaths and
injuries has likely been higher but goes unreported due to
the difficulty of access throughout much of the south.
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RONCO’s MDD teams were integrated with manual and mechanical
mine clearance operations in South Sudan.

Flooding during the rainy season made the roads in Malakal impassable at times.

Internally displaced persons fleeing conflict
areas such as the Darfur region are at particular risk because they have little or no local
knowledge of potential threats and are often
forced to move regardless of the potential
landmine problem.
Both the Sudanese government and the
SPLA have accepted assistance from the
United Nations, which is in the process of
implementing a plan to eliminate Sudan’s
landmine threat. In 2002, the United Nations
established the National Mine Action Office
in Khartoum, along with regional offices
in central and southern Sudan, and various
suboffices scattered throughout the country.
From these locations, the United Nations carries out all aspects of mine action, including
mine clearance, mine-risk education, survivor assistance and stockpile destruction. The
NMAO is responsible for coordinating those
efforts and helping build a lasting mineaction presence in the region. Unfortunately,
its operations have often been interrupted by
the ongoing conflict.
Following the most recent peace-treaty
agreement between the government and the
SPLA in January 2005, the United Nations
moved quickly to establish the U.N. Advance
Mission in Sudan with the goal of helping to ensure a lasting peace. It was quickly
evident that mine-affected roads severely
curtailed relief efforts and prevented development aid from reaching its destination, also
hampering peacekeeping activities and affecting the food supply of more than two
million people.
The RONCO Response
As a result of the above conditions, in
May 2005, the United Nations contracted
RONCO to provide the mine-action capacity necessary to support its programs.
In response, RONCO deployed two international clearance teams to conduct
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emergency clearance tasks and a training
team to develop a Sudanese demining/
explosive ordnance disposal capacity in
Wau and Malakal. Local capacity was to be
developed in the following areas:
• Emergency EOD
• Mine clearance
• Battle-area clearance
• Bunker and stockpile clearance
RONCO was uniquely prepared to quickly respond to the United Nations’ needs,
having extensive experience creating and
deploying its Quick Reaction Demining
Force, a Mozambique-based team developed
to respond to emergency tasks on short notice. RONCO initially deployed this force
to Sudan in 2002, following the ceasefire
agreement, where it greatly aided the safe
return of internally displaced persons and
increased the flow of humanitarian assistance through the Nuba Mountains. But
the 2005 Sudanese deployment necessitated
a more permanent force and the rapid development of local capacity. RONCO’s assistance included a management team, two
international clearance teams and two training teams—each complete with medical and
support staff, interpreters and all administrative, technical and logistical resources
required. In just one month, this force was
fully operational. It had established a liaison office in Khartoum, completed recruitment of local nationals, established two base
camps in Malakal and Rumbek, begun all
training preparations, and completed all certification requirements. Moreover, the force
was flexible enough to take on a variety of
EOD/demining tasks, quickly and efficiently train a local capacity, and cope with the
unique challenges of demining in Sudan.
In September, under two additional U.N.
contracts, RONCO began training EOD,
battle-area clearance, demining and minerisk education teams to increase capacity in

the cities of Juba and Ed Damazin. Eight
mine-detection dog teams were also trained
in Kadugli, in central Sudan, where they are
assigned to support RONCO’s demining
teams, although they have also briefly
deployed in support of two other clearance
organizations in the south. Finally, a survey
capacity was deployed to Wau. Since the
initial training of the Sudanese mineaction team in May, RONCO teams have
been involved in a variety of clearance tasks
critical to U.N. operations, including the
destruction of weapons caches, battle-area
clearance on future U.N. sites, and roadclearance tasks crucial to the relief effort in
southern Sudan.
The Challenges of Operating
In Sudan
Based on their long history of operating in austere environments, most recently
in Iraq and Afghanistan, RONCO’s teams
were prepared for the challenges of operating in a remote and hostile environment.
Nevertheless, operations in southern Sudan
proved far from routine, and the difficulties of security, supply, lack of transportation infrastructure and the inhospitable
weather proved to be a persistent challenge
to RONCO operations in the country.
Security concerns. The Lord’s Resistance
Army, a rebel group that routinely crosses the
border from Uganda into southern Sudan,
is a concern for demining operations in
the area. The group recently ambushed a
Fondation Suisse de Déminage convoy near
Juba and killed two deminers. As a result of
this incident and a continued LRA presence
in the area, RONCO was directed to close its
forward camp and fall back to its base camp
at Juba until the situation stabilized. A number of areas in the south are now considered
off limits, and many areas require the presence of armed escorts. As discussed below,

concern over the operations of the LRA had
a major impact on RONCO’s operations on
the Juba-to-Yei road.
Another major security concern arose
in August, following the death of Dr.
John Garang, the newly elected First Vice
President of Sudan. As a result, the United
Nations directed RONCO to suspend operations in Malakal for six days. In addition, security authorities were in the area
stopping RONCO’s local nationals during
their pre-dawn travel to the training/work
sites. These precautionary detentions were
impacting RONCO’s ability to train and
operate. In response, RONCO created identity cards for its local nationals to vouch for
their employment.
Supply challenges. Keeping operations
supplied is hardly routine in Sudan, as road
access throughout much of the south is difficult due to inadequate infrastructure, security issues, the presence of landmines
and weather concerns, particularly during
the rainy season. Supplying operations in
Malakal proved especially difficult, as there
is no road access to the city, necessitating the
airlifting or barging of supplies down the
Nile—a five-day trip from the nearest port,
Kosti. In addition, the limited road access between Wau and Rumbek and the total lack of
access between Rumbek and Juba also made
air transport a necessity, even though it is expensive and, in Sudan, unreliable, sporadic,
and sometimes extremely limited.
RONCO’s supply challenges didn’t end
there. Getting equipment into the country has proven challenging; the Khartoum
custom authorities continue to be slow in
releasing shipments, not only for RONCO,
but for the United Nations and others. Incountry construction materials such as steel
are expensive to procure, and bricks are
smaller and of lesser quality than elsewhere.
Gasoline has been of poor quality and very

expensive, averaging as much as US$5.50
per liter (US$20.82 per gallon).
Weather and disease. Weather is a major
factor in Sudan, and it can severely hamper
operations. The daytime temperature can
reach more than 122 F. During 2003, excessive heat precluded operations for 14  days
in June, 10 days in July, 25 days in August
and 20 days in September. During the rainy
season, dirt roads turn to a thick mud, slowing operations to a crawl and hampering the
mobility of all vehicles.
The terrain in southern Sudan also lends
itself to flooding. The ground is low and flat
with virtually no natural drainage, and the
soil saturates quickly, resulting in standing
water even during the brief periods when
it is not raining. At times, some areas have
been under as much as six to 10 inches of
standing water. In Malakal in particular,
the mud made operations almost impossible
for three-and-a-half months in 2005, from
August through November, forcing the relocation of RONCO training of local nationals
from Malakal to the Nuba Mountains. While
flooding was not quite as bad in Rumbek,
RONCO operations there were shut down
due to weather for more than 40 days in
2005. Bruce Burnett, RONCO’s Chief of
Party in Sudan, summed up the relentless
difficulties of the country’s weather: “In
the wet season, nothing moves; and in the
dry season, the ground is very hard, which
makes demining extremely challenging.”
Disease, particularly malaria, is also a
serious problem in Sudan—a problem exacerbated by the general lack of adequate
medical facilities throughout the south.
Instructing personnel on the proper use of a
malaria prophylaxis has proven to be crucial
in maintaining operational tempo. Rats and
poisonous snakes are also a serious health
hazard; tents that seal at the bottom and zip
to the top are necessary to keep them out.
Overcoming the Challenges
Historically, RONCO’s experience is
that the impact of clearance operations frequently outweighs its challenges. Despite
medical, security, transportation and weather issues, along with extended downtime
during clearance operations for the U.S.
Department of State from 2003 to 2005,
RONCO cleared hundreds of kilometers1 of
roads. Within weeks of clearing the road to
Kudru, the population grew from 15 to 90,
and after the road to Luba was cleared, the
population grew from 20 to over 100, significant increases that illustrate the importance of mine clearance in allowing refugees
and internally displaced persons to return to
their homes.

Clearance of the road from Juba to Yei
involved overcoming numerous obstacles;
since its completion in November, the impact of the operation is already having a
visible effect. The United Nations designated the road as a high priority for clearance
despite its location in the center of a highly
dangerous area near the known location
of LRA forces. While an armed section of
U.N.-supplied Bangladeshi soldiers provided
security at the task site, they were unable to
provide an armed escort for supply runs into
Juba, forcing re-supply by air. The cleared
road now serves as a much-needed route for
aid organizations and returning refugees and
IDPs, and its clearance has facilitated trade
with Uganda and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, providing for the economic
revitalization of the region.
RONCO is pleased to commit to building a local mine-action capacity in Sudan
and to bringing long-term stability and development to the country. With this help,
Sudan will soon have a growing ability to
independently sustain its own demining and
clearance operations.
See Endnotes, page 109
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